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ERIE v. TOMPKINS: A GEOGRAPHY LESSON
LOUIS L. MANDERINO*
The United States Supreme Court, in 1938, deciding the case of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,' held that a federal court in a diversity of
citizenship case must apply state law rather than federal law to the
controversy. 2 The Court subsequently held in 1941, in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc.,3 that the Erie case necessitated a
ruling that a federal court, sitting solely on the basis of diversity juris-
diction, had to use the conflict of law rules of the state in which it was
"sitting" in determining which state's law was applicable to the contro-
versy. Eight years later, a ruling in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,4
clearly announced that because of the Erie case, a federal court had to
close its doors to a diversity of citizenship action, if the state in which
it was "sitting" had a statute consistent with the United States Constitu-
tion which closed the doors of that state's courts to the same action.
It is the purpose of this work to show that the Erie case was decided
on explicit constitutional grounds, but that the doctrine of that case was
incorrectly extended in the Klaxon and Woods cases in that these de-
cisions were considered by the Supreme Court to be a constitutional
necessity. It will be shown that neither the Constitution nor Erie require
that a federal court apply state conflict of laws rules corresponding to
those of the state in which the federal court is "sitting," nor do either
require that a federal court close its doors if the state in which it is
"sitting" has closed its doors. It will be the position of this work that
the United States should be free to formulate an independent body of
* BA., St. Vincent College; LL.B., Harvard Law School. Professor of Law, Duquesne
University.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. It was clear prior to the Eritcz-- that a federal court had to apply the "written"
law of a state, and that Erie was co2 -; 'j'-, r. - ", with "unwritten" law, but for purposes of
this paper, the distinction is not importa; fhe effect of Erie was to enlarge the area of
state law which had to apply in a diversit. ction and so require that all state law "written"
and "unwritten" had to he applied in a di 'sity case. Erie v. Tompkins, supra note 1.
3. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
4. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
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conflict of laws rules to be applied in a federal diversity case, and that
the federal courts may ignore any state statute, though it may be consti-
tutional, which operates to bar the diversity litigants from the state court.
THE ERIE CASE
In the Erie case, Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued the Erie
Railroad Company, a New York State Corporation, in a New York fed-
eral court. In his suit he claimed damages for injuries sustained in an
accident in Pennsylvania through the negligence of the railroad. Juris-
diction was based solely on diversity of citizenship. The issue was
whether the law applicable to the case was state law or federal common
law. The Supreme 'Court overruled the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson, which held that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the
ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general juris-
prudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by its highest
court, but were ". . . free to exercise an independent judgment as to what
the common law of the state is-or should be . . . ." In overruling Swift
v. Tyson, Mr. justice Brandeis, after discussing the ". . . injustice and
confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson . . ." and the correct
interpretation of "laws" in the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
said: ". . . If only a doctrine of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied through-
out nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued
has now been made clear and compels us to do so. . . ."' From the above
language, it is clear that the court was basing its decision primarily on
constitutional grounds.
In explaining the constitutional compulsion, Brandeis adopted the
language of Mr. Justice Field ". . . protesting in Baltimore and Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401, . . ." which recognized ". . . the auton-
omy and independence of the States ... except as to matters by the con-
stitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. .... ".
Brandeis added, ". . . we merely declare that in applying the doctrine
this court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion
are reserved by the constitution to the several states ..." Brandeis's
argument rested on the fact that the United States could not indepen-
dently determine the law except in cases where it had specific authoriza-
tion by the Constitution to do so. It is important to note that Erie was
5. 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
6. Id. at 77-78.
7. Id. at 78-79.
8. Id. at 80. Although Brandeis's opinion does not make reference to Article 10 of the
Constitution, his remarks about invasion of states' rights and the reservation of rights by
the Constitution to the several states could only refer to that Article which reads: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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concerned with a conflict between state and federal law. The law appli-
cable in a diversity case had to flow from a state authority because no
authority had been delegated to the United States. Having decided
that state law applied, Brandeis did not consider which state's law was
to apply. The Court assumed Pennsylvania law, the lex loci, to be the
governing law, although the federal court in Erie was "sitting" in the
state of New York. The opinion does not indicate by what route Pennsyl-
vania law was reached. It could have been reached by reference to
the New York conflict of laws rule or by direct reference to Pennsylvania
law as a result of an independent determination by the federal court
as to which state's law should govern as the result of an accident which
occurred in Pennsylvania. The opinion throws no light on why Pennsyl-
vania law was used. The choice of the applicable state law was still an
open question as far as the Erie case was concerned. Thus, Erie decided
only that state law must apply to a diversity controversy, but did not
decide the general problem of which state's law was to be chosen or the
means of making a choice between the law of two or more states.
Could the same constitutional argument that sustained the need for
a federal court to apply state law as opposed to federal law, sustain a
decision as to which state's law had to be chosen by the federal court?
Three years after Erie, the Supreme Court said "yes," or at least mum-
bled what sounded like an affirmative reply.
THE KLAXON DECISION
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., a New York corpora-
tion suing a Delaware corporation in the federal district court in the state
of Delaware, alleged a breach of contract. In holding the Delaware corpo-
ration liable for damages, the district court applied the law of the state
of New York. As to which state's law should govern in awarding interest
on the damages, the district court made its own independent determina-
tion9 and concluded that New York law should govern; this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and held that in choosing which state's law to apply, the lower court was
to follow rules established by the state in which the federal court was
"sitting." Thus, the lower federal court in Klaxon had to inquire of
Delaware what the rules were by which Delaware would decide which
state's law to apply.
The reasons for this result were briefly stated by Mr. Justice Reed.
The result in Klaxon rested squarely on the Erie case. Reed stated that
the ". . . prohibition declared in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins against
such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to con-
9. 30 F. Supp. 425, 431 (1939).
10. 115 F.2d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 1940).
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flict of laws... 2"' In referring to the Erie case, Reed doubtlessly had in
mind the policy considerations of Erie, e.g., he speaks of the principle of
uniformity upon which the Erie case rests, and refers us to that portion
of the Erie opinion which discusses "the injustice and confusion" incident
to the Swift v. Tyson doctrine. But Reed likewise employs language
which smacks of constitutionality. Reed states that the conflict of laws
which a federal court "sitting" in Delaware applies ". . . must conform
to those prevailing in Delaware courts ... 2"1 He speaks of injustices
which may result from the Klaxon decision as ". . . attributable to our
federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the
constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of
its neighbor. ... "I He denies to the federal court the power to enforce
an independent "general law" of conflict of laws. In the opening sentence
of the opinion, the question is posed as to whether a federal court must
follow conflict of laws rules of the state in which it is sitting. Reed's
description of the Klaxon result as a "must"; his reference to the "federal
system" coupled with the expression that the prohibition in Erie neces-
sitated the Klaxon result, leaves us, at best, in doubt as to whether the
Court felt that the Klaxon result was constitutionally called for. 4 This
is particularly evident when we recall that Erie was expressly decided on
constitutional grounds by Mr. Justice Brandeis-a fact important to
remember when the Supreme Court invokes the name of Erie as justifica-
tion for other decisions.
The most interesting element is that in deciding that the rules by which
a federal court determines which state's law to apply must themselves
be state rules, the Court tells us that the standard in selecting a conflict
of laws rule must be the geographical location of the federal court, i.e.,
the state in which it is sitting. This phase of the Klaxon ruling, as will
appear later, is the key to a correct analysis of the decision in relation
to the Constitution. This standard of geographical location was later used
in the Woods case as the keystone in a Supreme Court ruling affecting the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity cases.
THE WOODS CASE
The "geographical location" feature of Klaxon was used by the Court
in 1947 in deciding a question of the availability of a federal forum to
diversity litigants when the state in which the federal forum was located
had closed its doors to the same litigants. The Court had held, in Angel
11. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
12. Id. at 496 (1941).
13. Id. at 496 (1941).
14. In Klaxon, Justice Reed referred to two circuit court cases [Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754, 759-762 (1st Cir. 1940); Waggaman v. General Finance Co., 116 F.2d 254,
257 (3d Cir. 1940)] which reached the same result as Klaxon, but neither of. these cases
throws additional light on the constitutional or policy reasons for the Klaxon result.
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v. Bullington,'5 that if a state statute prohibits the use of the state's
courts to hear a particular action, and the statute is constitutional, the
federal court sitting in that state must likewise close its doors to the
action even though all other requirements of diversity jurisdiction had
been met. A subsequent case, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., decided in
1949 (although the Court was only reaffirming the Angel decision),"
affords a better basis for discussion because of the simplicity of the facts.
In Woods, the Court held that a Tennessee corporation could not bring
suit against a Mississippi resident in the federal district court "sitting"
in Mississippi, because a Mississippi statute17 closed the doors of the
Mississippi Courts to any corporation which had not filed a written
power of attorney designating an agent on whom service of process might
be had. Since the Mississippi state courts were closed to the diversity
litigants, the federal court was also closed because it was geographically
15. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
16. The Court's analysis of the Angel case in Woods is interesting, and incorrect. In
Angel, a Virginia plaintiff had sued in a North Carolina state court for a deficiency judg-
ment against a North Carolina resident. The Supreme Court of North Carolina said that
a state statute dosed the state courts to claims for deficiency judgment and barred the
plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the state statute violated the United States Constitution but
when the adverse decision was rendered by North Carolina, he did not appeal to the United
States Supreme Court as he might have. He then commenced an action for the same
deficiency judgment in the federal district court sitting in North Carolina. The Supreme
Court said that the federal court could not hear the case. Douglas explains the Angel result
in Woods by saying that it rests on two grounds, 1) the prior suit in the North Carolina
court was res judicata and 2) the policy of Erie precluded maintenance in the federal court
in diversity cases of suits to which the state had closed its doors. See Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949). He treats these two reasons as independent grounds for
the Angel decision. He referred to the second reason as an alternative ground apart from
the res judicata basis. But both reasons were absolutely necessary to the Angel result.
Neither would have sufficed alone. The prior decision was res judicata because the plaintiff
had had an opportunity to raise the constitutionality of the state statute in the United
States Supreme Court by appealing the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
He did not avail himself of the opportunity to appeal the North Carolina decision and had
"lost his chance." He could not raise the point in his federal action. But the North Carolina
statute is only relevant to the federal action if the federal court was bound to respect the
statute. If the federal court could have kept its doors open even though North Carolina
closed its doors, the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute would be irrelevant, and
the plaintiff's failure to appeal the decision would also be irrelevant. That which was res
judicata was the issue of the state statute's constitutionality. This becomes relevant only
after a decision that the federal court in North Carolina was bound by the state statute,
and had to dose its doors. The ruling that the court had to follow the state statute rests on
the Erie doctrine. Thus, Erie was necessary to show that a federal court was bound by the
state statute, and the res judicata to show that the statute's constitutionality had already
been decided as far as the plaintiff was concerned.,
17. Miss. CODE § 5319 (1942) required a foreign corporation doing business in the
State to file a written power of attorney designating an agent on whom the service of,
process might be had. It also provided, "Any foreign corporation failing to comply with the
above provisions shall not be permitted to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of
the courts of this state."
1966-1967]
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located in the state. This was so, the Court said, because of Erie v.
Tompkins. In a brief opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas tells us that the
Woods result is necessary in the light of the Angel case, and that Angel
follows the view of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York."8 A reading of the Angel
and Guaranty Trust cases leaves no doubt that their results were con-
sidered a constitutional necessity by the Court. 9 Douglas's reference to
these cases clearly indicated, since Douglas does not present other
grounds for the decision, that the Woods result was wrapped in the cloak
of constitutional dignity.
Thus, we see that geographical location as a basis of constitutionality
plays a vital role in both Klaxon and Woods. In Klaxon, location deter-
mines which state's conflict of laws rule must be followed, and in Woods,
location is an indispensable consideration in determining jurisdiction of a
federal court in diversity of citizenship cases.
At this point, let us recall that the Erie case, while maintaining that no
constitutional delegation of authority by the states had been made to the
United States to promulgate contract law, tort law, etc., of course quali-
fied its position by recognizing that the United States did have authority
to promulgate any law if the authority to do so had been delegated and
enumerated by the states. Let us now examine provisions of the consti-
tution which did delegate authority in certain matters to the United States.
18. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19. It is, of course, difficult to quote piecemeal and give a fair impression of a court
opinion but the following are not atypical of the spirit in which the Erie doctrine is viewed
in both Angel and Guaranty. In Angel, Frankfurter said, ". . . If North Carolina has au-
thoritatively announced that deficiency judgments cannot be secured within its borders, it
contradicts the presupposition of diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that State to
give such a deficiency judgment. North Carolina would hardly allow defeat of a State-wide
policy through occasional suits in a federal court. What is more important, diversity juris-
diction must follow State law and policy. A federal court in North Carolina, when invoked
on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which North Carolina has withheld.
Availability of diversity jurisdiction which was put into the Constitution so as to prevent
discrimination against outsiders is not to effect discrimination against the great body of local
citizens." 330 U.S. at 191-92. And in Guaranty, the same writer had this to say in concluding
that a federal court in New York had to follow the statute of limitations of the state in
which it sat: ". . . Since it was conceived that there was 'a transcendental body of law out-
side of any particular State, but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute' . ..
State court decisions were not 'the law.' ...Not unnaturally, the federal courts assumed
power to find for themselves the content of such a body of law." 326 U.S. at 99. Frankfurter
said that Erie expressed a policy "that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial
power between State and federal courts . . . ." Id. at 109. And later, that "a policy so im-
portant to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminol-
ogies niceties ..... " Id. at 110. He also describes the Erie doctrine as requiring critical analysis
of the "nature of jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity cases. . . ." Id. at 110. A
full reading of the cases is necessary to appreciate that constitutional considerations were
uppermost in the Court's mind.
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DELEGATED POWER AND THE LOCATION DOCTRINE
In Section 8 of Article I, of the Constitution, 20 Congress is given the
authority to establish inferior federal courts. There is no restriction in
Section 8, or elsewhere in the Constitution, as to number, type, or location
of these inferior federal courts which Congress may ordain and establish.
The authority is general. In considering legislation under this section, the
First Congress discussed various proposals as to the establishment of
inferior federal courts, and by the judiciary Act of 1789 set up a system
of independent federal courts.2' None of these courts had jurisdiction
which overlapped state boundaries. The jurisdiction of the several courts
was contained within state lines. This was the system which was estab-
lished in 1789, and since that time, with one minor exception,22 the juris-
diction of a federal court has never crossed a state line. This is the system
which is functioning today.
This element of containment within state lines of the jurisdiction of an
inferior court has had a history of permanency similar to the permanency
of the constitutional elements of our government. But it is not a constitu-
tional element of our federal system. There is no constitutional mandate
in Article I that the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts be con-
tained within state lines. The First Congress introduced this feature into
the system of federal courts, and this feature has been allowed to remain;
but this has been done as a discretionary matter. It was not required by
the Constitution. The authority delegated to Congress was broad enough
so that it could have established a federal system of inferior courts whose
jurisdiction not only crossed a state line but encompassed the total ter-
ritory of two, three, or any number of states. Thus today, a federal dis-
trict court "sits" in each of the 50 states only because of Congressional
enactment, not constitutional mandate.
To pursue this by way of illustration, as an example of what Congress
could do under Section 8 of Article I, a federal district court (a Section 8
"inferior court") could be established whose jurisdiction covered States
A, B, C, and D. That court (i.e., the courthouse, the judges and their
offices, etc.) could be geographically located only in State A. But though
it were "sitting" in State A, it would have jurisdiction covering the ter-
ritory contained within States A, B, C, and D. No argument can be con-
ceived by this author to show that such a plan would be without the
authority granted to Congress by Section 8 of Article I, and therefore
unconstitutional.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, reads, "The Congress shall have the power . . . to constitute
tribunals inferior to the supreme court ..
21. AcT OF SEPT. 24, 1789, § 2, 1 STAT. 73.
22. During 1801-1802, a district court encompassed the territory in the District of
Columbia and parts of Maryland and Virginia. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT II (1928).
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By the first section of Article III, the inferior courts which Congress
may establish without restriction as to location may be vested with
the judicial power of the United States, which is defined in the second
section of Article III.23 This power is by way of delegation of authority
by the states to the United States. One of the grants of judicial power
extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity. . . between citizens of different
states . . . 2" This is the basis of what is commonly known as diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts. This grant of power has been vested by
Congress in the federal district courts.2 4 The authority of the federal
courts to hear cases between citizens of different states is clear enough
and statement of that fact should suffice.
A federal court, then, from what has been said above, may be located
anywhere when hearing a diversity of citizenship case. Yet, it was the
geographical location of the federal court in the Klaxon case which de-
termined that the rules of Delaware were to be used in deciding which
state's law should apply. Keep in mind that the court was not "sitting"
in Delaware because of a constitutional mandate. As far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned the federal court's "sitting" in Delaware was accidental.
It could just as well have been sitting in New Jersey deciding the very
same case, between the New York and Delaware corporations. Since the
Court's location was constitutionally accidental, the Court's decision that
location determines the conflict of laws rule to be applied does not have
constitutional merit.
Once the location criterion is eliminated from Klaxon, the case loses
its effect constitutionally. The opinion is reduced to a requirement that
state conflict of laws rules be used without any constitutionally required
criterion by which a choice of states' rules should be made. In view of this
fact a brief examination will be later made concerning the necessity of
using state conflict of laws rules in a federal court, and whether the
prohibition declared in Erie against an independent "federal law" should
be interpreted as including conflict of laws rules.
The same criticism of the location doctrine applied to the Klaxon deci-
sion is applicable to the Woods decision. The federal court in Woods was
required to respect the Mississippi statute because the court was "sitting"
in Mississippi. Since the constitution is indifferent to the location of the
federal courts, the place in which the court "sits" cannot be a constitu-
tional standard limiting the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court.
Both Klaxon and Woods, resting as they do on the constitutionally
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, reads: "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States; . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § I,
reads, "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. .. .
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
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invalid location theory, are not then essential ingredients of any federal
system as conceived by the Constitution.
FEDERAL CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES
Let us again assume a situation in which a federal court could be
sitting in State A, exercising diversity jurisdiction in an action involving
litigants from States B and C. In such a situation, suppose a disagreement
were to arise as to whether the law of State B or State C is applicable to
the controversy. State A has no interest whatsoever in the controversy
except, of course, that the United States has rented or purchased space for
a courthouse in which the federal court is "sitting." The Court, cognizant
of the limitations imposed by the Erie case, must find some state authority
behind the law which it applies in the case. But which state's law? The
law of State B or the law of State C? A choice must be made!
If the requirement in Erie that a federal court must apply "state law"
is read to include conflict of laws rules, the court is facing a blank wall.
It must make a choice between the law of State B or State C, and the very
rules by which it is to make this choice must themselves be rules of either
State B or State C. Yet, the court would still face the problem of deter-
mining whether the conflict of laws rules of State B or State C should be
used in solving the first problem, namely, which state's law is applicable
to the controversy. We could go on, of course, and say that Erie also re-
quires that the rules by which the court is to determine those rules by
which the state law is chosen must also be the rules of some state. But
this game of logical gymnastics could go on and on until it rendered the
diversity litigants indigent as a result of paying for appellate briefs. At
some point in the game, it would be necessary for the court to make an
initial independent determination as to which state's sovereign authority
is applicable, without reference to either state's laws or conflict of laws
rules; otherwise the court could not get its feet off the ground. By what
standard, then, is the court to make this initial independent determina-
tion? The Constitution provides no affirmative standard nor does it con-
tain any limitations of the use of an independent standard. The Supreme
Court's location doctrine provides one means of making this initial inde-
pendent determination, but the court could also establish any other inde-
pendent standard. Only after this initial determination had been made
would the court fall under the yoke of Erie and be constitutionally bound
to apply the law of the state which it had independently selected as
applicable. Such a procedure would not violate the constitutional princi-
ples of the Erie case. Erie was concerned with a cleavage between state
and federal law, and said that the law applicable in a diversity case had
to flow from a state authority and could not flow from any federal au-
thority because no authority had been delegated to the United States to
declare such law. But as we have seen, the Constitution did delegate au-
1966-19671
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thority to the United States to establish federal courts and to vest in them
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. These two grants of power necessarily
carry with them the authority to make the initial determination as to
which state's law is applicable; otherwise, as suggested, a federal court
could not get its feet off the ground in a diversity suit, because it would
be lost for a guiding first principle in the selection of applicable state law.
With the above-mentioned delegation of powers, the authority of the
United States to promulgate an independent body of conflict of laws rules
is particularly clear in view of the "necessary and proper" clause of the
Constitution. Section 8 of Article I gives to Congress the authority ".... to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into ex-
ecution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or
office thereof .. ." The meaning of the "necessary and proper" re-
quirement of this clause was defined by Chief Justice Marshall in the
case of McCulloch v. Maryland,26 as follows: ". . . Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional .... ,,2" As noted earlier, authority to promulgate fed-
eral conflict of laws rules is a necessary concomitant of the United States'
delegated authority to hear diversity cases in inferior federal courts, and
nothing in the Constitution declares a prohibition against such authority.
The authority is "necessary and proper."
Since the United States is free to provide independent conflict of laws
rules for diversity actions, the result in the Klaxon case was not consti-
tutionally necessary. The lower court had made an independent deter-
mination that the award of interest should be governed by New York
law .2  A Supreme Court reversal would have been proper only if it
criticized the method by which the independent determination had been
made. This, of course, would have been a policy, as distinguished from a
constitutional, criticism.
The Woods case did not involve the same problem as Klaxon, but the
same analysis applies. The Mississippi federal court was constitutionally
free to determine which state's law was applicable to the case. It may,
of course, have determined independently that only Mississippi law should
govern the controversy, and would then have to decide whether Missis-
sippi law gave the plaintiff a right to damages, or merely closed the doors
of its courts to the plaintiff. There can practically be a significant differ-
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. 128 Wheat. 316 (1819).
27. Id. at 421.
28. 30 F. Supp. 425, 431 (1939).
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ence. The difference is not academic. If the plaintiff had a right but could
not sue in Mississippi, there may be no difference as far as Mississippi is
concerned, but any one of the other 49 states could have opened their
courts to the action and applied Mississippi law. A federal court is not
more 'bound by the statute of Mississippi, the defendant's state, which
closed the court doors, than it is bound by Tennessee's, the plaintiff's
state, law, which conceivably would open its doors to the same claim.
The federal court's jurisdiction to hear a diversity case is a constitu-
tional delegation of power not limited by location of the court.
CONCLUSION
This paper, as stated earlier, was to show that the result in Klaxon and
Woods were not constitutionally necessary. No opinion is expressed con-
cerning the wisdom of the results on policy grounds. Certainly no opinion
could be expressed on the basis of what the Supreme Court has told us
in those cases about policy grounds. Both assume, with practically no dis-
cussion, that the same policy considerations which were discussed in the
Erie case are applicable to Klaxon and Woods. It is the opinion of
this writer that policy discussion was sparse because the court did think
that the decisions were constitutionally necessary and that an elimina-
tion of the constitutional grounds which are not valid, would prompt the
court to consider more thoroughly the wisdom of the Klaxon and Woods
results. In doing so they could well perceive that the same policy con-
siderations discussed in Erie might not be applicable to the Klaxon and
Woods results. This seems particularly true of the Woods result, 9 and
opponents of the Klaxon result, who see significant differences between
the policy considerations of Erie and those of Klaxon, are not lacking. °
The Supreme Court should at the first opportunity provide us policy
reasons why Klaxon and Woods are wise, and should keep in mind the
Congressional prerogative to overrule Klaxon and Woods at any time.
29. The Woods decision affected the jurisdiction of a federal court to hear a diversity
suit, which raises more serious problems than Klaxon. And certainly the "forum shopping"
arguments behind the Erie decision are not applicable because a reversal of Woods would
not mean that a plaintiff could "forum shop" for a favorable law. He could, of course,
take advantage of a federal forum in a state which would deny him access to its courts but
the "law" applied would always be a "state" law, not a "federal" law.
30. HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 633-636
(1953); 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 928, 934 (1953).
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